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Down the Rabbit Hole: Applying a
Right to Be Forgotten to Personal
Images Uploaded on Social Networks
Eugenia Georgiades*
The right to be forgotten has been the subject of extensive
scrutiny in the broad context of data protection. However, little consideration has been given to the misuse of personal images that are
uploaded on social networks. Given the prevalent use of online and
digital spaces, social networks process and use various forms of
data, including personal images that are uploaded by individuals.
The potential for misuse of images is particularly acute when users
upload images of third parties. In light of the European Union’s
enshrinement of the “right to be forgotten” amid provisions of the
General Data Protection Regulation that tighten protections for
Internet users’ privacy, this Article examines whether the European
“right to be forgotten” is a model that could be adopted, specifically
in Australia, and perhaps elsewhere, as a mechanism to protect
against the misuse of people’s images within social networks.
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“The Internet doesn’t forget.”1
INTRODUCTION
Social networks facilitate communication and interaction online.
When people communicate and interact online, their private lives
often become public. Social networks such as Facebook, Instagram,
and Twitter have sparked new trends in the way people exchange
and communicate information, particularly personal images. These
platforms actively encourage people to share their lives with their
friends, family, and social connections within the digital environment.2 All too frequently, people’s images are captured in photographs and shared on social networks without the person knowing

1

Jef Ausloos, The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’—Worth Remembering?, 28 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 143, 143 (2012).
2
Eugenia Georgiades, Reusing Images Uploaded Online: How Social Networks
Contracts Facilitate the Misuse of Personal Images, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. J. 435, 441
(2018). Part of Facebook’s Data Policy states that:
[Facebook is] able to deliver our Services, personalise content, and
make suggestions for you by using this information to understand how
you use and interact with our Services and the people or things you’re
connected to and interested in on and off our Services. We also use
information we have to provide shortcuts and suggestions to you. For
example, we are able to suggest that your friend tag you in a picture
by comparing your friend’s pictures to information we’ve put together
from your profile pictures and the other photos in which you’ve been
tagged. If this feature is enabled for you, you can control whether we
suggest that another user tag you in a photo using the ‘Timeline and
Tagging’ settings. When we have location information, we use it to
tailor our Services for you and others, like helping you to check-in and
find local events or offers in your area or tell your friends that you are
nearby. We conduct surveys and research, test features in development, and analyse the information we have to evaluate and improve
products and services, develop new products or features, and conduct
audits and troubleshooting activities.
See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/
792W-W93K] (emphasis added); see also BRENDAN VAN ALSENOY ET AL., BELGIAN
PRIVACY COMMISSION, FROM SOCIAL MEDIA SERVICE TO ADVERTISING NETWORK: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF FACEBOOK’S REVISED POLICIES AND TERMS (Mar. 31, 2015),
http://www.law.kuleuven.be/citip/en/news/item/facebooks-revised-policies-and-termsv1-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4RF-DJCA].
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that their images have been taken and shared online.3 In the process
of sharing images on social networks, people often relinquish control over the use of their images, which allows the images to be
exploited by third parties and social networks.4 The use of digital
and communication technologies creates a need to protect personal
images and the information captured in those images from misuse.5
This Article examines whether the European Union (“EU”)’s
“right to be forgotten” provides a possible solution to the problem
of personal images being misused on social networks in Australia.
Specifically, it considers whether the EU’s right to be forgotten is a
model that could be adopted in Australia as a mechanism to protect
against the misuse of people’s images within social networks.

3

Notable examples include the infamous photograph of a naked Prince Harry partying
in Las Vegas. See Prince Harry Naked During Vegas Rager, TMZ (Aug. 22, 2012),
http://www.tmz.com/2012/08/21/prince-harry-naked-photos-nude-vegas-hotel-party
[https://perma.cc/J48L-E5N2]. The problem with this is captured in Katy Perry’s tweet
against Australian Media where she said: “Australian PRESS: you should be ashamed of
your paparazzi & tabloid culture. Your paparazzi have no respect, no integrity, no
character. NO HUMANITY.” Perry also wrote: “I was stalked by many grown men today
as I tried to take a quiet walk to the beach. These men would not stop as I pleaded over &
over to let me have my space. Many other people stopped to try to help but the paps
continued to laugh at me & hold their barrels up and shoot.” And further: “This is
PERVERTED & disgusting behaviour that should NEVER be tolerated, especially by
people who do NOT want this.” Katy Perry (@katyperry), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2014, 6:39
PM), https://twitter.com/katyperry/status/535985788983721984/photo/1 [https://perma.cc
/683Q-FB7F].
4
See generally VICTOR MAYER-SCHONBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN
THE DIGITAL AGES 1–2 (2011); Franz Werro, The Right to Inform v. the Right to Be
Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash, in HAFTUNGSRECHT IM DRITTEN MILLENNIUM =
LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM (Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi et al. eds., 2009); Ausloos,
supra note 1; Paul A. Bernal, A Right to Delete?, 2 EUR. J.L. & TECH. (2011); Muge
Fazlioglu, Forget Me Not: The Clash of the Right to Be Forgotten and Freedom of
Expression on the Internet, 3 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 149, 151 (2013); Andra Giurgiu,
Challenges of Regulating a Right to Be Forgotten with Particular Reference to Facebook,
7 MASARYK U. J.L. & TECH. 361, 362 (2013); Alessandro Mantelero, The EU Proposal for
a General Data Protection Regulation and the Roots of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’, 29
COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 229, 230 (2013); Marie-Andrée Weiss, First Amendment
Trumps Couple’s Right of Publicity; Copyright Claim to Proceed, 9 J. INTELL. PROP. L. &
PRAC. 797, 798 (2014).
5
See Bert-Jaap Koops, Forgetting Footprints, Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the
“Right to Be Forgotten” in Big Data Practice, 8 SCRIPTED 229, 230 (2011); see also Viviane
Reding, The Upcoming Data Protection Reform for the European Union, 1 INT’L DATA
PRIVACY L. 3, 3 (2011).
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I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The right to be forgotten originated from a growing concern
about the impact of digital technologies in general on personal
privacy. As Viviane Reding observed, “If an individual no longer
wants his personal data to be processed or stored by a data controller, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should
be removed from their system.” 6 The early 1990s saw the use of
digital technologies increase, which created a need to protect people
from potential abuse.7 As communication technologies sparked new
trends in the way people exchanged and communicated personal
information, the EU recognized that new data protection laws were
necessary to protect individual privacy and private life.8 To this end,
European regulators developed the Data Directive 9 in 1995 to protect an individual’s personal data and the processing of such data.
European data-protection laws were enacted at a time when technology was less advanced and the exchange of personal information
was significantly lower than it is at present,10 in part because the use
of social networks was not as prevalent twenty-five years ago as it
is today.
One of the challenges that arises with most new forms of technology is that the technology often evolves faster than the law.11 The
position with social networks is no different. As Andra Giurgiu
argues, “The main problem relies in the fact that the rapidly changing societal model has not allowed for legal norms to catch up.”12
Concerned about the threat to individual privacy created by the
6

Press Release, Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the Eur. Comm’n, EU Justice
Comm’r, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for
Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age (Jan. 22, 2012),
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-26_en.htm
[https://perma.cc/JPU6VYZ7].
7
See Koops, supra note 5, at 230; see also Reding, supra note 5, at 3.
8
See Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, opened for signature
Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S No. 5, Art 8.
9
Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Directive].
10
See Giurgiu, supra note 4, at 362–64.
11
Id. at 362–65; Koops, supra note 5; Ausloos, supra note 1, at 148.
12
Giurgiu, supra note 4, at 362–65.
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widespread use of data storage and data mining, European regulators
recognized that the rights to privacy and data protection in the Data
Directive had become outdated.13
The problems with the law under the 1995 Data Directive were
highlighted in the landmark 2014 Court of Justice decision of
Google Spain v. Gonzalez.14 The case arose when Mr. Gonzalez
lodged a complaint against La Vanguardia Ediciones SL (a daily
Spanish newspaper with a wide circulation), Google Spain, and
Google Inc.15 The basis of the complaint was that whenever an
internet user searched for Mr. Gonzalez’s name using the Google
search engine, the results would link to two pages from the La
Vanguardia newspaper, which mentioned Mr. Gonzalez’s name in
connection with proceedings for social security debts.16
Mr. Gonzalez requested two things. The first was that the newspaper remove or alter the pages so that “the personal data relating to
him no longer appeared or to use certain tools made available by
search engines in order to protect the data.”17 The second request
was that Google Spain and Google Inc. be required to remove or
conceal the personal data relating to him so that that data would not
be included in the search results.18 The grounds for Mr. Gonzalez’s
claims were that the proceedings for the social security debts mentioned in the newspaper links had been resolved for a number of
years. Consequently, that information and any references to that
information was no longer relevant to answering a search of his
name conducted at the present time or in the future.19

13

See discussion infra Part I.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 (May 13, 2014).
15
Id. at ¶¶ 14–15.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
14
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The court ordered Google Spain to remove Gonzalez’s personal
data20 from the internet.21 The court held that data controllers should
remove data where the data was “inadequate, irrelevant or no
longer relevant, or excessive in relation to [the] purposes [for which
they were originally collected or processed] [emphasis added] and
in the light of the time that has elapsed.”22 The Court of Justice ruled
that people could request the removal of their data published by
operators of search engines.23
The Google Spain v. Gonzalez 24 decision not only highlighted
some of the inadequacies with the 1995 Data Directive, but it also
provided a possible solution. After some debate,25 on December 15,
201526 the European Parliament passed the General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”),27 which received approval from the European Council on April 8, 2016 and became effective on May 28,
2018.28 One of the key aspects of the GDPR is that it supersedes the

20

Data Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2(a), which defines data broadly as:
‘[P]]ersonal data’ shall mean any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable person is
one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific
to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social
identity.
21
Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶ 93.
22
Id. The ruling is based on the Data Directive, supra note 9.
23
Id. at ¶ 98.
24
Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317 at ¶ 97–98.
25
See W. Gregory Voss, Looking at the European Union Data Protection Law Reform
Through a Different Prism: The Proposed EU General Data Protection Regulation Two
Years Later, 17 J. INTERNET L. 1, 22 (2014); see also Peter Blume, The Myths Pertaining
to the Proposed General Data Protection Regulation, 4 INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 269, 269–
73 (2014).
26
See European Commission Press Release IP/12/46, Agreement on Commission’s EU
Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market (Dec. 15, 2015), available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm> [https://perma.cc/25XL-ETPP].
27
Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and
on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119)
1 [hereinafter General Data Protection Regulation].
28
See Reform of EU Data Protection Rules, EUR. COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.eu/
info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform_en [https://perma.cc/KT8L-FJ9K].
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Data Directive and strengthens individual rights, through the incorporation of a right to be forgotten.29
The 2016 GDPR provides that where a data controller has made
data public, the controller must take “reasonable steps, including
technical measures[ in relation to data for the publication of which
the controller is responsible], to inform [third parties] which are processing the data that a data subject [requests them to erase] any links
to, or copy or replication of [that] personal data.”30 The GDPR provides that a data subject shall have “the right to obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data” relating to them and the
abstention from further dissemination of such data especially in
relation to personal data which are made available by the subject
data while he or she was a child.31 Article 17 also gives data subjects
the right to be forgotten and to erase data relating to them.32 It provides that users have the right to have information deleted in four
situations. This is where:

29
The proposed amendments to the Data Directive included the rights of users to request
that their personal data is “no longer processed and deleted when they are no longer needed
for legitimate purposes.” Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the
Regions: A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union,
COM (2010) 609 final, at sec. 2.1.3 (Apr. 11, 2010) [hereinafter A Comprehensive
Approach]; see also General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 17.
30
Id. at art. 17(2).
31
Id.; see also id. at art. 17(1) (referencing back to articles 6(1) and 8(1) of the
regulation).
32
Id. at art. 17; see generally Ausloos, supra note 1; Steven C. Bennett, The Right to Be
Forgotten: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 161 (2012);
Karen Eltis, Breaking Through the Tower of Babel: A Right to be Forgotten and How
Trans-Systemic Thinking Can Help Re-Conceptualize Privacy Harm in the Age of
Analytics, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 69 (2011); Koops, supra note 5;
Barbara McDonald, Privacy, Princesses, and Paparazzi, 50 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 205
(2005); Dominic McGoldbrick, Developments in the Right to Be Forgotten, 13 HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 761 (2013); Reding, supra note 5; Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of
Privacy and Free Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525
(2012); Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88 (2011–12);
Jeffrey Rosen, Free Speech, Privacy, and the Web That Never Forgets, 9 J. TELECOMM. &
HIGH TECH. L. 345 (2011); Stijn Smet, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Reputation:
Human Rights in Conflict, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 183 (2010); Rolph H. Weber, The Right
to Be Forgotten: More Than Pandora’s Box?, 2 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & E-LAW
120 (2011); see also generally A Comprehensive Approach, supra note 29; Werro, supra
note 4.
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a) the personal data are no longer necessary in
relation to the purposes for which it was
collected or otherwise processed;
b) the data subject withdraws consent on which
the processing is based according to point (a)
of Article 6(1), or point (a) of Article 9(2),
and where there is no other legal ground for
the processing;
c) the data subject objects to the processing
pursuant to Article 21(1) and there are no
overriding legitimate grounds for the processing, or the data subject objects to the processing pursuant to Article 21(2); and
d) the personal data have been unlawfully
processed.33
When applying the right to be forgotten to personal images shared
online, there are a number of criteria that must be satisfied, as explained further in Part II below. Broadly, these are that:
1. the requirements for protection are met;
2. the use of the images falls within the scope of the
right; and
3. the use of the images falls outside of the
exceptions to the right to be forgotten.
The following section examines these elements in more detail.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR PROTECTION
There are a number of criteria that must be satisfied in order for
the right to be forgotten to apply. The first is that the images must
fall within the meaning of “data” as provided in the GDPR.34 The
second is that the person must be a “data subject.”35 The third factor
that needs to be satisfied for the right to apply is that the images

33

General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 1 7(1); Giurgiu, supra note
4, at 366; Mantelero, supra note 4, at 233; McGoldbrick, supra note 32, at 763.
34
See infra Section II.A.
35
See infra Section II.B.
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must be controlled by a third party who is a “data controller.”36 The
following sub-sections examine each in turn.
A. Data
In Europe, the term “data” is defined broadly to include any
information that relates to a “data subject.”37 Any information that
relates to a person or identifies a person in an online environment
will be considered “personal data.”38 Photographs depicting people’s likenesses are a way of identifying individuals and thus satisfy
the definition of data in the Data Directive.39
People who join social networks and engage in the digital world
exchange and share various types of information. This information
forms the data that is processed, collected, and stored in websites’
information systems. As social networks allow people to share
images with multiple users simultaneously, a number of issues arise
in relation to the control of those images. One issue with the control
of uploaded images occurs when a person uploads images and those
images are consequently reshared by third parties. The reshared images will be stored, collected and processed on their respective profile pages (as well as the network’s information systems). Thus, a
person whose images are reshared loses control over these images
when they are reshared. Another issue that arises is that, under
European law, capturing and sharing another person’s image on a
social network by posting photographs of them online may be considered “processing and collecting” data. Given that people not only
share and exchange their own images but also third-party images on
social networks, such images that are shared form the “data” of the
subject (i.e., the person whose image is being used or shared). Consequently, a person loses control over their image when their image
is captured in a photograph by a third party.
36

See infra Section II.C.
See Data Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2(a) (“‘personal data’ shall mean any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an
identifiable person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by
reference to an identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical,
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity”).
38
Id.
39
Id.; see also generally Spiros Simitis, From the Market to the Polis: The EU Directive
on the Protection of Personal Data, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1995).
37
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B. Data Subject
The second criterion that needs to be satisfied for the right to
apply is that the person must be a “data subject.” European data
protection laws apply to data subjects who are located in Europe.
People who live in countries that are part of the EU, are entitled to
rely on a right to be forgotten when their data are processed, collected, or transferred to countries outside of the EU.40
According to Article 4(1) of the GDPR, a data subject is a “natural person,” 41 construed broadly as a person who can be “identified
directly or indirectly, in particular reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”42 People who are
users of social networks and social media will fall within the definition of a “data subject.” Accordingly, any photographs that contain
a person’s image would also fall within the definition of “personal
data,” as discussed above.
C. Data Controller
The third factor that needs to be satisfied for the right to apply is
that the images must be controlled by a third party who is a “data
controller.” Article 4(7) of the GDPR defines a “data controller”
as follows:
‘[C]ontroller’ means the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or any other body which alone
or jointly with others, determines the purposes and
means of the processing of personal data; where the
purposes and means of processing are determined by
Union or Member State law, the controller or the

40
See Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 56 I.L.M. 245 (2015) (EU)
(Schrems objected to the transfer of his personal data from Facebook Ireland to servers in
the United States).
41
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(1); see also Opinion
5/2009 on Online Social Networking adopted on 12 June 2009, The Working Party on the
Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data set up by
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995,
art. 29, 1995 O.J. (L 281/31) (EC) [hereinafter Working Party Opinion].
42
Id.
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specific criteria for its nomination may be provided
for by Union or Member State law.43
Google Spain v. Gonzalez confirms that search engines are data
controllers and as such are liable under the GDPR.44 To fall within
the definition of data controllers, the social network must determine
the purpose and means of processing personal data. Social networks
clearly fall within the definition of data controllers, because virtually
every social network determines the purpose and means of processing personal data. The processing of personal data occurs when
people subscribe to a social network service because they provide
personal information such as name, email, and often a profile picture, which are stored, collected, and processed on the social
network’s information systems. For example, when people use
Facebook, personal data processing occurs as an integral part of the
company’s mission: “bringing people together.”45 In pursuit of this
purpose, Facebook determines how people’s photographs will be
processed and collected, including that the network will collect
those images when people share images of third parties.46 Thus,
Facebook is a data controller because the network processes, stores,
transfers and collects people’s personal data.47 Similarly, Instagram’s purpose is for people to share their photographs with other
users, and it is for this purpose that they collect and process people’s
information and specifically their photographs.48 Twitter also shares

43

General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(7); see also Data
Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2; Rebecca Wong, Social Networking: Anybody Is a Data
Controller, NOTTINGHAM L. SCH. (Sept. 21, 2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1271668
[https://perma.cc/8CED-L4AD] [hereinafter Wong, Anybody Is a Data Controller].
44
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 33 (May 13, 2014).
45
Adam Mosseri, Bringing People Closer Together, FACEBOOK (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/01/news-feed-fyi-bringing-people-closer-together/
[https://perma.cc/4R4V-RMCA].
46
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7 (providing that a
person can withdraw their consent).
47
See, e.g., Rebecca Wong, Social Networking: A Conceptual Analysis of a Data Controller,
14 COMM. L. 142, 142 (2009) [hereinafter Wong, A Conceptual Analysis]; Working Party
Opinion, supra note 41.
48
See Features, INSTAGRAM, https://about.instagram.com/features [perma.cc/PN2R7XQD]; see also Wong, supra note 47; Working Party Opinion, supra note 41.
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the same purpose as Facebook and Instagram, which satisfies the
definition of a data controller of the Data Directive and the GDPR.
One question that arises is whether individuals who share other
people’s images fall under the definition of data controller. Given
the scope of Web 2.0 and the participative culture that it created,
individuals who share other people’s images may also be treated as
“data controllers.”49 This is because people share and exchange personal images within their profiles on social networks and thus facilitate the “processing” of personal data. A person may be a “data
controller” when they capture an image and upload it on their social
network profile page. When a person captures their own image (i.e.,
a selfie) and uploads that image on their profile, they are in effect
collecting and processing their own data. This data in turn is stored
on the social network information system. In situations where a person captures an image of a third party, the information captured in
the photograph forms part of a record which is collected and processed when it is uploaded online. As a result, a person may also
collect and process a third party’s data, and thus each person who
has a social network page has the ability to collect and process other
people’s data. Consequently, it is arguable that people who take photographs of third parties and upload and exchange the images on
social networks would facilitate the “processing of personal data”
and as such arguably fall within the definition of “data controller.”
III. USE IS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
The right to be forgotten provides that the “fundamental rights
and freedoms of natural persons, and in particular their right to
privacy with respect to the processing of personal data” should be
protected.50 The right to be forgotten strengthens the rights of data
subjects when their data is used or misused, by giving them the right
to control the use of their image when the image is shared by third
parties.51 The right to be forgotten is not a mechanism that will
actually prevent the misuse of personal images. Rather, it provides
49

See, e.g., Wong, A Conceptual Analysis, supra note 47; Working Party Opinion, supra note

41.
50

Data Directive, supra note 9, at art. 1; see also General Data Protection Regulation,
supra note 27, at art. 17.
51
See supra Section II.C.
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a remedy for people who have had their personal images misused.
For example, the right enables a person whose data has been misused to request the removal of the data; it does not prevent or provide protection against the misuse of the data. This right extends to
data such as personal images that are uploaded and shared on social
networks or appear in search results.52 Thus, a person would not be
able to rely on the right to be forgotten to prevent the misuse of their
image, but would be able to request that the data controller remove
the misused image from the network’s system.
The right to be forgotten operates in a number of different situations. The first is where the data is no longer relevant or if it is
outdated (as in Google Spain v. Gonzalez).53 The second is when a
person withdraws the consent on which the processing of the data is
based.54 Under the GDPR, the withdrawal must be unambiguous.
When people sign up to a social network, they agree to the social
network’s terms of use. By agreeing to the terms, they are providing
their consent to the network to use, collect, process, and store their
images. By entering into a social network contract, people give their
consent to the network to capture their photographs legitimately.
However, people often do not understand what the consent entails.55
Social network contracts allow personal images to be passed to
third-party affiliates for use in advertising or marketing purposes.
Consequently, once a person has consented to the network’s terms
of use, their photographs and personal images—as well as the ways
in which their images may be used—are out of their control.56
Under the GDPR, users may withdraw their consent allowing
social networks to process, store, and collect their data.57 Such withdrawal of consent has particularly acute ramifications when a user
52

See id.
See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 49 (May 13, 2014).
54
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7 (providing that a
person can withdraw their consent).
55
See Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 1880, 1884 (2013).
56
See generally Bernal, supra note 4; see also Ausloos, supra note 1, at 146; Fazlioglu,
supra note 1, at 151; Mantelero, supra note 4, at 230.
57
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7(3) (providing that
“[t]he data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time”).
53
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decides to terminate their social media account.58 When a user
terminates their social network contract, the network is still able to
use any images of the (former) user that have been reshared on the
network—even if the user removes all of their content on their profile page from the network by deleting their account. This is due to
the fact that users agree to the social network’s terms of use which
include the non-exclusive licensing of their content.59 The nonexclusive license clause provides that a social network may continue
to use the images after the contract is terminated. This means that a
network may be in breach of the GDPR if it continues to use people’s images after the contract ends. Accordingly, when this occurs,
a person would be able to use the right to be forgotten to request that
the network remove their images from the network.
The third situation where the right to be forgotten might apply is
when a person objects to the processing of their data.60 A situation
of this kind might occur, for example, when a person takes a photograph of a third party who does not want their image to be shared
online. The GDPR defines “processing” broadly as:
any operation or set of operations which is performed
on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether
or not by automated means, such as collection,
recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise
58

Particularly significant are Facebook’s Terms of Service. In relation to the right to be
forgotten, any requests from its users to erase the data would have to be erased from all of
Facebook’s data-storage systems, not just its platform. This contravenes Facebook’s new
Terms of Service, which also state that the network can access archived copies of users’
shared data despite the user deleting or deactivating their account. See, e.g., Data Policy,
FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/update [perma.cc/4JCT-M2KB];
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms/ [perma.ccU7PYNNHQ].
59
See, e.g., Georgiades, supra note 2, at 436–38; VAN ALSENOY ET AL., supra note 2;
Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (Jan. 30, 2015), https://www.
facebook.com/legal/terms/previous [perma.cc/9BH6-ECXH]; Terms of Service, TWITTER
(Jan. 1, 2020), https://twitter.com/en/tos [perma.cc/TEX8-24WU]; Terms of Use,
INSTAGRAM (Apr. 19, 2018), https://help.instagram.com/478745558852511 [perma.cc/
LY97-4SG3].
60
An objection to the processing of a data subject’s data may be aimed at a data
controller such as a search engine like Google, or a social network site like Facebook.
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making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction.61
When a person takes their own photograph or a photograph of a third
party, they are potentially “processing” data in so far as they are
collecting and recording the image. Similarly, the uploading of an
image on a social network page may fall within “use, disclosure,
dissemination or otherwise making available.”62
A fourth situation where the right to be forgotten may apply is
where a data subject’s information is transferred for processing to a
country outside of Europe that does not protect data to the standard
required by European law.63 Specifically, the right to be forgotten
allows data subjects to object if their data has been transferred to
third countries that do not safeguard or protect the fundamental right
to respect for private life and freedom of that right that the European
Union law guarantees.64 Schrems v. Data Protection Commissioner
stands for this proposition, as the Court of Justice held that
the existing safe harbor provisions which provided that a data subject’s data may be transferred to a third country were invalid.65

61

General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(2) (emphasis added).
Id.
63
Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Protection Comm’r, 56 I.L.M. 245, ¶ 71 (2015) (EU).
The Court of Justice stated that:
[A]s is apparent from the very wording of Article 25(6) of Directive
95/46, that provision requires that a third country ‘ensures’ an adequate
level of protection by reason of its domestic law or its international
commitments. Secondly, according to the same provision, the
adequacy of the protection ensured by the third country is assessed ‘for
the protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of
individuals.’
Id.
64
Id. at ¶¶ 90–91 (citing C-293/12 and C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Others,
2014 E.C.R 238, ¶¶ 52–55); see also EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, art. 8 (June 1, 2010),
www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5MRF-FUFJ]
(“Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his
correspondence.”).
65
Schrems, 56 I.L.M. 245, at ¶ 107. In a press release outlining the decision, the Court
of Justice noted that the Irish High Court had to examine:
[Schrem’s] complaint with all due diligence and, at the conclusion of
its investigation, . . . decide whether, pursuant to the directive, transfer
62
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Furthermore, the Court of Justice held that a data subject may object
to the transfer or processing of their data to a third country if it can
be shown that the third country does not protect personal data in
accordance with European law.66 As the Court of Justice said:
[T]he Commission found that the United States
authorities were able to access the personal data
transferred from the Member States to the United
States and process it in a way incompatible, in
particular, with the purposes for which it was transferred, beyond what was strictly necessary and
proportionate to the protection of national security.67
The Court of Justice also noted that when transferring a data subject’s data to a third country, the data subject would need to have
“administrative or judicial means of redress enabling, in particular,
the data relating to them to be accessed and, as the case may be,
rectified or erased.”68 Consequently, the right to be forgotten
allows data subjects to object if their data have been transferred to
third countries which do not safeguard or protect the fundamental
right to private life and freedoms that are guaranteed within
the EU.69
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
There are a number of exceptions to Article 17 (‘the right to be
forgotten’) in the GDPR. One of the most important exceptions is
found in Article 80 of the GDPR, which provides an exception for
journalists and artists for the processing of personal data and freedom of expression.70 This requires that a data subject’s request to
of the data of Facebook’s European subscribers to the United States
should be suspended on the ground that that country does not afford an
adequate level of protection of personal data.
European Commission Press Release 117/15, The Court of Justice Declares that the
Commission’s US Safe Harbour Decision Is Invalid (Oct. 6, 2015).
66
Schrems, 56 I.L.M. 245, at ¶ 107.
67
Id. at ¶ 90 (emphasis added).
68
Id. (emphasis added).
69
Id. ¶ 91.
70
Compare General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 80, with Data
Directive, supra note 9, at art. 9 (previous exception for “processing of personal data
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remove data must be balanced against freedom of speech or
expression but also the public’s interest in having access to the
information.71 For example, as noted above, the Court in Google
Spain v. Gonzalez held that outdated information lies beyond the
scope of the public’s interest.72
The balancing of freedom of expression and the right to be
forgotten is critical when people share and exchange personal
images on social networks. The GDPR recognizes that when
people upload and share images within a social network, there are
competing interests between the users who upload images, the
users that access images, and the subjects of the images. When
deciding how the balance between these interests is to be drawn, the
court may take a variety of factors into account. In Google Spain v.
Gonzalez, the court considered “the nature of the information in
question and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life and on
the interest of the public in having that information, an interest
which may vary, in particular, according to the role played by the
data subject in public life.”73 In the case of public figures, the courts
seem willing to give more weight to the public’s right to know than
their ability to keep matters private, because “the interference with
[a famous person’s] fundamental rights is justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to the information in question.”74
One of the important consequences of the right to be forgotten
is that it enables people to regain control over their data. One of the
main arguments against the right to be forgotten is that it threatens
freedom of speech. It appears that if people did regain control, this

carried out solely for journalistic purposes or the purpose of artistic or literary expression
only if they are necessary to reconcile the right to privacy with the rules governing freedom
of expression”). See also, e.g., Fazlioglu, supra note 4, at 154; Anne Flanagan, Defining
“Journalism” in the Age of Evolving Social Media: A Questionable EU Legal Test, 21
INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 1, 1 (2012); Mantelero, supra note 4, at 234; Giovanni Sartor,
The Right to Be Forgotten: Balancing Interests in the Flux of Time, 24 INT’L J. L. & INFO.
TECH. 72, 72 (2015).
71
See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81.
72
Id. ¶ 98.
73
Id. ¶ 81.
74
Id. ¶ 97.
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would be detrimental to a person’s freedom of expression or speech.
The detriment potentially is attributed to overriding need to maintain
control of the information that is uploaded by users. This is because
every person has the right to express themselves and may do so by
uploading images of third parties. More often, it means that people
whose images are captured and uploaded lose their ability to control
the use of their image because it is captured by another person who
is the creator of the image. Thus, when images are captured and uploaded the use of the images is subject to the social network’s terms
of use which means that the network controls the use of the images.
While these concerns are valid, they often disregard the key issue
redressed by the right to be forgotten, which is that large internet
firms such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft have turned the
sharing of images online into a source of advertising revenue and
thus have developed a business model that depends on the collection
and storage of vast quantities of personal images online.75 For
example, in Fraley v. Facebook, the court found that Facebook’s
Sponsored stories misappropriated users’ profile images because
users did not explicitly agree to have their image used in connection
to the Sponsored Stories feature.76
Another exception that potentially restricts the operation of
the right to be forgotten is the “personal or household purposes”
exception. According to Article 2 of the GDPR,77 where the processing of personal data is by a “natural person in the course of a
purely personal or household activity,” it will fall outside the scope

75

See Bernal, supra note 4.
Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 803–06 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Judge Koh
dismissed Facebook’s claim that users had consented to the use of their profile images to
be used because the plaintiffs were “likely to be deceived likely to be deceived into
believing [they] had full control to prevent [their] appearances in Sponsored Story
advertisements while otherwise engaging with Facebook’s various features, such as
clicking on a ‘Like’ button, when in fact members lack such control.” Id. at 814–15. See
Jesse Koehler, Note, Fraley v. Facebook: The Right of Publicity in Online Social Networks,
28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 963, 964 (2013); see also generally Francesca Grea, To Like or
Not to Like: Fraley v. Facebook’s Impact on California’s Right of Publicity Statute in the
Age of the Internet, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 865, 869 (2014).
77
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 2.
76
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of the Regulation.78 One example where the purely personal or
household exception may not apply to personal data that is processed in the course of purely personal or household activity is highlighted in Bodil Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping.79 The
court in this case held that the personal or household activity exception did not apply to referring to people’s names on an internet page
that identified them by name or by other means because the information related to charitable and religious activities.80 However, the
personal and household exception covers most of the activities that
people engage in online, including uploading and sharing a personal
image on a personal profile page.81
The household exception predates the GDPR, as it had been
incorporated into the 1995 European Data Directive 95/46/EC. In
1995, the internet was in its infancy, and most people’s access to
information was limited to written records or held on a computer
that did not have internet.82 Given that the exception effectively
excludes individuals from the right to be forgotten, it has very
important consequences for how useful the right to be forgotten may
be in protecting against online misuse of personal images.83

78

Id. at art. 2(2)(c). See also Zuzanna Warso, There’s More to It Than Data ProtectionFundamental Rights, Privacy and the Personal/Household Exemption in the Digital Age,
29 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 491, 491–92, 495 (2013); Wong, A Conceptual Analysis,
supra note 47, at 147; see generally Wong, Anybody Is a Data Controller, supra note 43.
79
Case C-101/01, Bodil Lindqvist v. Åklagarkammaren i Jönköping, 2003 E.C.R.
I-12992, ¶ 45.
80
Id.
81
See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Annex 2: Proposals for Amendments
Regarding Exemption for Personal or Household Activities, EUR. COMMISSION (Feb. 27,
2013), https://ec.europa.eu/justice/article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/
20130227_statement_dp_annex2_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7A2U-BQPW] [hereinafter
Working Party, Annex 2].
82
See Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2013, Opinion of AG Jääskinen, ¶ 27 (“In 1995, generalised access to the internet
was a new phenomenon. . . . However, it is clear that the development of the internet into
a comprehensive global stock of information which is universally accessible and searchable
was not foreseen by the Community legislator.”); see also Claire Bessant, The Application
of Directive 95/46/EC and the Data Protection Act 1998 When an Individual Posts
Photographs of Other Individuals Online, 6 EUR. J.L. & TECH. 1, 2 (2015).
83
See generally Bessant, supra note 82.
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V. REDRESSING AND REMEDYING THE MISUSE OF PERSONAL DATA
BY COMPANIES
Social networks increasingly intrude on people’s privacy
because they have a “great data concentration”84 about their user’s
online interactions. Companies such as Google, Instagram, Facebook, Microsoft, and Twitter collect, process, and store vast
amounts of personal data. These companies retain a significant
amount of their users’ data which increasingly are used to intrude
on people’s personal lives online. For example, Facebook tracks
their users even if they are not logged into the Facebook platform;
as such it acquires data about the user without their knowledge.85
Social networks historically promoted “the idea that sharing information is a social norm and that privacy or oblivion is an outdated
concept.”86 By encouraging people to share their images and personal information, companies like Facebook, Google, and Instagram
(to name a few) collect vast amounts of data. This collection of data
highlights that “the same companies are progressively collecting an
enormous amount of data in order to profile individuals and, above
all, to extract predictive information with high economic, social,
political and strategic value.”87 As Mantelero argues, “[i]n a world
where it is assumed that no value is attributed to privacy and oblivion, the only ones to gain from this abandonment of old rights are
the owners of these platforms or services which have an exclusive
and comprehensive view of the entire mass of data.”88
Social networks “represent[] an antimony because they do not
share the information taken from the data and, even though they give
little value to privacy and affirm the end of oblivion (describing life
as a timeline); they extract a high value from this data.”89 Thus,
when social networks store and collect people’s images, the network

84

Mantelero, supra note 4, at 234.
See Jason Murdock, Facebook Is Tracking You Online, Even If You Don’t Have An
Account, NEWSWEEK (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:53 AM EDT), https://www.newsweek.com/
facebook-tracking-you-even-if-you-dont-have-account-888699 [https://perma.cc/Q6AEXAS2].
86
Mantelero, supra note 4, at 234.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
85
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yields power over their users, because even if the user can delete
their photographs on their profile page, they cannot control the use
of their personal image on their friend’s profile page. As Mantelero
suggests, the data collected and stored by social networks represents
“not only money, but also power,” and this power in turn facilitates
the ongoing exploitation and the expropriation of users’ data.90 The
right to be forgotten is an “attempt to reduce the amount of data collected” and this reduction would undermine the social network’s
power.91 Mantelero states that “[f]or this reason the owners of big
data have tried to make it more difficult to change privacy settings,
have used technical devices to track users in a persistent way and
have thus evoked the end of the privacy era.”92
One of the consequences of the right to be forgotten is that it
enables people to regain control over their data by reshifting the
power imbalance that exists between corporations and individuals.
The right to be forgotten illuminates the critical issue of users
being given the right to delete the data which is controlled by
social networks.93 These companies retain a significant amount of
their users’ data (images), which increasingly intrudes on people’s
personal lives and thus diminishes a user’s autonomy over their own
image. As Bernal argues, this “kind of transfer of power, that kind
of re-balancing, could have possibilities to redress the current
imbalance over personal data—and to help re-establish at least some
control that people both have lost and feel that they have lost.”94
While the right to be forgotten is not a mechanism that will
actually prevent the misuse of personal images, it does provide an
ex post facto remedy for people whose personal images have been
misused. This is because the right to be forgotten enables people to
request that when their images have been misused they are deleted
from the network.95 In this sense, the right to be forgotten would
provide a practical solution for social media users as well as any

90
91
92
93
94
95

Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Bernal, supra note 4, at 4.
See discussion supra Part I.
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third parties (who may be non-users) that object when their image is
captured and is uploaded or shared online.
VI. CRITICISMS OF THE RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
A number of arguments have been made against the right to be
forgotten. Insofar as the right allows an individual to have data about
them deleted or removed, there is a concern that it will facilitate selfcensorship.96 The fear here is that the right to be forgotten will allow
people to rewrite history97; i.e., that it will allow people to manage
public information in order to ensure that only certain perspectives
of them are in the public domain.98 While there is a chance that the
right to be forgotten may be used in this way, such use would require
the courts to adopt a very broad reading of the type of situations
where the right to be forgotten might be applied. On most readings,99
such cases of “censorship” would only be allowed in limited and
presumably justified situations, for example when the data is outdated, irrelevant, or when a person withdraws their consent to have
the data published.100
Another concern with the right to be forgotten is that it will
restrict freedom of speech and/or expression.101 It is clear that the
right to be forgotten will remove information from the public
domain. In introducing the right to be forgotten the intention of the
European legislators was not to restrict freedom of the press or free
96

See Giurgiu, supra note 4, at 367–68; Koops, supra note 5, at 232; see generally
Bennett, supra note 32; Pere Simón Castellano, The Right to Be Forgotten Under European
Law: A Constitutional Debate, 16 LEX ELECTRONICA 1 (2012); Omer Tene & Jules
Polonetsky, Privacy In the Age of Big Data: A Time for Big Decisions, 64 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 63 (2012); Smet, supra note 32; Weber, supra note 32.
97
See generally Bennett, supra note 32; Smet, supra note 32; Tene & Polonetsky, supra
note 96; Weber, supra note 32.
98
Some scholars argue that the right to be forgotten needs to be framed in a different
language, such as “the right to delete.” See, e.g., Bernal, supra note 4; see generally
Bennett, supra note 32; Smet, supra note 32; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 96; Weber,
supra note 32.
99
See generally Julia Powles, The Case That Won’t Be Forgotten, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
583, 586–90, 606–10 (2015); Lawrence Siry, Forget Me, Forget Me Not: Reconciling Two
Different Paradigms of the Right to Be Forgotten, 103 KY. L.J. 311, 328–31 (2015).
100
See generally Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección
de Datos (AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317; Bennett, supra note 32; Bernal, supra note 4; Smet,
supra note 32; Tene & Polonetsky, supra note 96; Weber, supra note 32.
101
See Koops, supra note 5, at 238–39.
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speech; rather it was to protect an equally important right: personal
privacy. Given that the GDPR includes an exception for free speech,
it seems that many of the complaints about free speech are about the
balancing of the rights and where the line is to be drawn. Any risk
to free speech or freedom of the press has been incorporated into the
GDPR and any requests must be balanced against freedom of expression and the public interests.102
A number of other problems exist with the right to be forgotten;
one of which is that there are many aspects of the new regulation
and its application that are uncertain. The right to be forgotten itself
is not problematic, but the application of the right may potentially
give rise to problems. For example, when personal images are misused online, it is unclear whether the social network or the individual
would be responsible for removing the image.103 This is important
because the data subject may not be the owner of the image and
would need to seek permission from the copyright owner or social
network to remove the photograph on their behalf. For example,
when a person captures an image of a third party in a photograph,
the creation of the image gives rise to copyright protection. As such
102

This is because there are a number of exceptions to the right to be forgotten as stated
in General Data Protection Regulation, art. 17(3), which provides:
Paragraphs 1 and 2 will not apply to the extent of the processing is
necessary:
1) for exercising the right of freedom of expression and
information;
2) for compliance with a legal obligation which requires
processing by Union or Member State law to which the
controller is subject or for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest or in the exercise of official
authority vested in the controller;
3) for reasons of public interest in the area of public health in
accordance with points (h) and (i) of Article 9(2) as well as
Article 9(3);
4) for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or
historical research purposes or statistical purposes in
accordance with Article 89(1) in so far as the right referred
to in paragraph 1 is likely to render impossible or seriously
impair the achievement of the objectives of that processing;
or
5) for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims.
General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 17(3).
103
Id. at art. 17(1).
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it is the creator of the image and not the subject that owns the copyright.104 This means that the subject in the image may not have a
right to remove their image from a third-party profile page.105 As a
result, it may be unclear whether the data subject has a claim on the
copyright owner to remove their image from their personal profile
page. It is also uncertain whether the data subject has a claim on the
social network provider to remove their image from the network.106
The distribution of responsibilities in the removal of data is “not
particularly clear, since both the SNS provider and the user/uploader
are being designated as data controllers in the standard interpretation
of the Directive.”107
Another problem with the right to be forgotten relates to the
scope of the personal or household purpose exception.108 The problem with Article 2 of the GDPR is that it is unclear “whether an
individual posting personal data openly for a worldwide, unrestricted audience can still be considered to be processing the data for
personal or household purposes.”109 This is because a person who
disseminates an image on a social network may still fall within a
personal or household purpose.110
Another uncertainty that may arise with the right to be forgotten
is the way in which the right will apply in relation to photographs,
as distinct from written information. Although photographs clearly
will fall within the definition of “data,” it is less clear to predict
whether a photograph will trigger the right to be removed. For
example, it is not clear what will need to change for a photograph to
be declared “irrelevant,” “inadequate,” or “excessive.”111 Most of

104

See generally Eugenia Georgiades, The Limitations of Copyright: Sharing Personal
Images on Social Networks, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 230 (2018).
105
See id.
106
See Koops, supra note 5, at 239.
107
Id. at 238 (citing Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 1/2010 on the
Concepts of “Controller" and "Processor” (2010), at 21).
108
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 2(c).
109
Working Party, Annex 2, supra note 81, at 3.
110
See Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, Oblivion: The Right to Be Different . . . From
Oneself: Reproposing The Right to Be Forgotten, 13 REVISTA DE LOS ESTUDIOS DE
DERECHO Y CIENCIA POLÍTICA DE LA UOC 122, 128 (Feb. 2012).
111
See Google Spain v. Gonzalez:
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the examples given where the right to be forgotten applies are in
relation to textual data—newspapers stories and the like—not
photographs.112 While this is an issue that needs clarification, it
would seem that photographs are capable of triggering the right to
be forgotten in certain situations. It will be more difficult to establish
the criteria required for applying a right to be forgotten for a photograph than it is with textual data. Although the right to be forgotten
may not be exercised in relation to trivial matters such as changes in
fashion or a bad haircut, it may apply where a photograph presents
factual information that later becomes irrelevant or where the image
contains sensitive data.113 For example, a photograph could contain

It follows from those requirements, laid down in Article 6(1)(c) to (e)
of Directive 95/46, that even initially lawful processing of accurate
data may, in the course of time, become incompatible with the directive
where those data are no longer necessary in the light of the purposes
for which they were collected or processed. That is so in particular
where they appear to be inadequate, irrelevant or no longer relevant,
or excessive in relation to those purposes and in the light of the time
that has elapsed.
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD),
2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 93; see also General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at
Recital 65 (“A data subject should have the right to have personal data concerning him or
her rectified and a ‘right to be forgotten’ where the retention of such data infringes this
Regulation or Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject. In particular,
a data subject should have the right to have his or her personal data erased and no longer
processed where the personal data are no longer necessary in relation to the purposes for
which they are collected or otherwise processed, where a data subject has withdrawn his
or her consent or objects to the processing of personal data concerning him or her, or
where the processing of his or her personal data does not otherwise comply with this
Regulation.”) (emphasis added).
112
See Rhiannon Williams, Telegraph Stories Affected by the EU ‘Right to Be
’Forgotten,’ TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/google/
11036257/Telegraph-stories-affected-by-EU-right-to-be-forgotten.html [https://perma.cc/
NT2Y-8X2P] (demonstrating that most of stories in The Telegraph affected by the right to
be forgotten pertain to articles rather than photographs); see generally Philip Delves
Broughton, Four Years for British Convent Girl Who Ran a Ring of 600 Call Girls,
TELEGRAPH (Oct. 24, 2003), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4190437/Fouryears-for-British-convent-girl-who-ran-a-ring-of-600-call-girls.html
[https://perma.cc/
MS7K-9HRE]; Italian Job Stunt Lands Mini Driver a Ban, TELEGRAPH (Nov. 10, 2008,
8:26 PM GMT), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/howaboutthat/3419280/
Italian-Job-stunt-lands-Mini-driver-a-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8YMP-DTQT].
113
For example, four images had been removed from The Telegraph. The images in
question relate to Max Mosley’s 2008 sex scandal. See generally Williams, supra note 112.
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information concerning a person’s political views or revealing
information about their health.114
The right to be forgotten raises a number of practical issues. One
issue is that the removal of images may be difficult to implement.115
Even though a network may remove an image, it may still be possible to view the image online.116 This is because it may take some
time to remove the image from the cache memory, or the
images may be stored on a person’s hard drive or in the cloud.117 As
Ausloos says, even if “notice and take down procedures might take
content out of the (public) sight,” it does not result in the removal of
the images from the data user’s servers.118 Even if a person chooses
to remove their images from their own profile page, the image may
still be available if the image has been shared and reshared. These
problems are exacerbated by the global nature of the internet, which
may place images in jurisdictions with little or no protection. There
is little use in demanding an image be removed in one country if
users can simply obtain the image from another country.
VII.

SHOULD OTHER COUNTRIES ADOPT THE RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN?

A. Imagining an Australian Right to Be Forgotten
If a right to be forgotten were adopted in Australia, it would help
to restore the imbalance between people whose images are captured

114
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at rec. 10; see also Data
Directive, supra note 9, at art. 2.
115
See Cecile de Terwangne, Internet Privacy and the Right to Be Forgotten/Right to
Oblivion, 13 REVISTA DE INTERNET, DERECHO Y POLÍTICA 109, 117 (2012); see also
generally Kathryn Smith, The Right to Be Forgotten: Legislating for Individuals to Regain
Control of Their Personal Information on Social Networks, 7(1) REINVENTION (2014).
116
See Terwangne, supra note 115, at 117.
117
See id.
118
Ausloos, supra note 1, at 148. Ausloos states that while European citizens can request
Facebook to send them all personal data in Facebook’s possession, Facebook still keeps
track of your removed data as well. See Omer Tene, Privacy: The New Generations, 1
INT’L DATA PRIVACY L. 15, 25 (2010); see also generally Meg Leta Ambrose & Jef
Ausloos, The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond, 3 J. INFO POL’Y 1 (2013).
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and those who control the data.119 An Australian version of this right
would also enable people to regain control over their images on
social networks. If introduced it “could give individuals the possibility of more control over their data and hence more autonomy. It
could directly reduce the amount of data that is held—hence that is
vulnerable—as individuals exercise their right to delete.”120 An
Australian right to be forgotten would also address broader privacy
concerns with respect to social networks. It would help to respond
to the fact that social networks increasingly chip away at personal
privacy. Particularly concerning is the way that people’s personal
images are prone to misuse by those who collect information, as the
data can be aggregated and combined with other forms of data,
which can then be used for profiling.121
It is arguable that the right to be forgotten might also force social
networks to justify why they are holding information.122 As
Bernal said:
It could force those holding data to justify why
they’re holding it—in such a way that the data subjects understand, for if data subjects cannot understand why the data is wanted, they might simply
delete it. If there is a benefit and that benefit is made
clear, why would an individual wish to delete that
data? Most importantly of all, the fact that data could
be deleted at any time could encourage the development of business models that do not rely on the holding of so much personal data.123
Insofar that the right to be forgotten “reflects a paradigm shift” in
privacy, where the individuals have “power[, they] . . . can and

119

See generally Paul De Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, The Proposed Data
Protection Regulation Replacing 95/46/EC: A Sound System for the Protection of
Individuals, 28 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 130 (2012); Jasmine McNealy, The
Emerging Conflict Between Newsworthiness and the Right to Be Forgotten, 39 N. KY. L.
REV. 119 (2012); Robert Kirk Walker, The Right to Be Forgotten, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 257
(2012).
120
Bernal, supra note 4.
121
See id.
122
See id.
123
Id.
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should restrict the actions of those who might oppress, abuse or take
advantage of those individuals.”124 This right would help individuals
to regain control over how their personal images are used. For too
long, in American culture and to some extent Australian culture,
privacy interests have been overshadowed by, or come second to,
freedom of expression and speech. As it stands, a right to be forgotten would be useful in Australia because it would potentially close
some of the gaps in the existing legal protection for personal images.
While there is some legal protection, the protection is fragmented
and piecemeal under federal and common law. For example, the
Australian Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) does not protect personal images
that are uploaded by individuals.125 An aggrieved person would need
to seek a remedy under other areas of law such as copyright or tort—
for example, the tort of breach of confidence. However, it should be
noted that the tort of breach of confidence may only protect personal
images, if the misuse of the image relates to matters of an intimate
or sexual nature. Presently, Australian law provides specific protection for certain types of images such as those of an intimate (and/or
of a sexual) nature. Despite this, there is no recognized image right
or a right to one’s image, which leaves people vulnerable and
unprotected when an image is captured and uploaded by a third
party. In particular, a right to be forgotten would enable people to
control use of their image, particularly when it is shared by other
people on social networks.126 Incorporating a right to be forgotten in
the Australian Privacy Act would provide people with similar

124

Id.
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
126
Virginia Da Cunha is an Argentinian singer, dancer, model and actress who had posted
various pictures of herself in short shorts, swimsuits, tank tops, and at least one sexually
provocative pose on Twitter and Facebook. She sued Yahoo Argentina for linking and
showing results of her name and image to websites offering sexual content, pornography,
escorts, and other related activities. See Juzgado de Primera Instancia [1A INST.] [Court of
First Instance], 29/7/2009, “Da Cunha, Virginia c. Yahoo de Argentina s/ Daños y
Perjuicos,” (Resulta, I, para. 3) (Arg.) [hereinafter Opinion of Judge Simari]. Da Cunha
was successful at first instance; however, she lost on appeal in 2010. See Cámara Nacional
de Apelaciones en lo Civil de la Capital Federal [CNCiv.] [National Court of Civil Appeals
of the Federal Capital], sala D, 10/8/2010, “Da Cunha Virginia c/ Yahoo de Argentina SRL
y otro s/ Daños y Perjuicios,” (Arg.); see also generally Edward L. Carter, Argentina’s
Right to Be Forgotten, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 23 (2013).
125
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privacy rights to European citizens who have clearer and stronger
data protection.
A right to be forgotten could be adopted in Australia by amending the Australian Privacy Act and the Australian Privacy Principles
(APPs) to include “data subject” protection rights similar to the
EU’s GDPR.127 Incorporating data subject rights in Australia’s
Privacy Act would provide more relief for people when their image
is misused.
As noted in Part III, infra, the GDPR allows a person to object
to the transfer of their data to another country when the standard of
data protection is not to the European standard.128 The Australian
Privacy Act has a similar provision under the Australian Privacy
Principles (APPs) that relates to cross-border disclosure of personal
information.129 However, it is uncertain whether the Australian
Privacy Principle 8 would provide adequate protection to prevent an
Australian national’s data from being disclosed to a third-party
country, because the text is silent on whether the disclosure of
the information to a third party would constitute a “transfer.” Australian Privacy Principle 8 provides that, prior to any disclosure of
personal information to an overseas recipient, there must be reasonable steps taken to ensure that the overseas recipient does not breach
the Australian Privacy Principles.130 What is “reasonable” is not
defined in the legislation which makes it difficult for determining
whether a person in Australia would have the same rights as
European citizens. Moreover, where data is processed and stored
overseas, it may also be difficult to prove that data is processed,
collected, or stored in Australia, or by an Australian corporation.
Consequently, provisions similar to Article 21 of the GDPR, i.e., the

127

See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 4(1).
See generally id.
129
See Australian Privacy Principles (Cth) c 8 (July 2019) (Austl.), https://www.oaic.
gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/app-guidelines/chapter-8-app-8-cross-borderdisclosure-of-personal-information [https://perma.cc/99CE-NH9M].
130
Id. (“[B]efore an APP entity discloses personal information about an individual to an
overseas recipient, the entity must take reasonable steps to ensure that the recipient does
not breach the APPs in relation to that information. Where an entity discloses personal
information to an overseas recipient, it is accountable for an act or practice of the overseas
recipient that would breach the APPs (s 16C).”).
128
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right to object to the transfer of personal data, should be adopted
in Australia.
B. Imagining a Right to be Forgotten in the United States
Over the years, many legal scholars have argued against adopting a right to be forgotten in the United States because it would
oppress freedom of expression and speech.131 Given the serious data
breaches that occurred with Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal,132 and at Equifax,133 there has been a stronger accountability put
towards American companies which operate services in
Europe. In particular, data breaches that have occurred in Europe
have alerted American legislators towards recognizing the need for
stronger privacy protection for personal data.134 Consequently, data
breaches that occurred in Europe have impacted the United States
by demonstrating the need for stronger data privacy protection.135
American companies that provide online services to European
citizens and operate in Europe must comply with the GDPR. For
example, in Europe, Google received over 2.5 million requests for
data erasure since the right to be forgotten was introduced in
2014.136 As a result of Google Spain v. Gonzalez,137 the European
131

See generally Eltis, supra note 32; McGoldbrick, supra note 32; Smet, supra note 32;
Daniel J. Solove, ‘Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Daniel J.
Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PENN. L. REV. 477, 564 (2006); Daniel J. Solove,
The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE
L. J. 967 (2003); Weber, supra note 32.
132
See Emma Graham-Harrison & Carole Cadwalladr, Revealed: 50 Million Facebook
Profiles Harvested for Cambridge Analytica in Major Data Breach, GUARDIAN (Mar. 17,
2018), https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebookinfluence-us-election [https://perma.cc/9R8J-NZVC].
133
See Seena Gressin, The Equifax Data Breach: What to Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/09/equifax-data-breach-what-do
[https://perma.cc/KJ6S-ZKX6].
134
See Hillary C. Webb, Note, People Don’t Forget: The Necessity of Legislating
Guidance in Implementing a U.S Right to Be Forgotten, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1304,
1331 (2017).
135
See generally id.
136
Stuart Lauchlan, The EU’s Right to Be Forgotten Should Stay Within the EU—An
Important Legal Opinion in a Fake News World, DIGINOMICA (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://diginomica.com/the-eus-right-to-be-forgotten-should-stay-within-the-eu-animportant-legal-opinion-in-a-fake-news-world [https://perma.cc/T6FK-NZH2].
137
Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317 (May 13, 2014).
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Court of Justice introduced the right for people to be able to request
that their data be removed. While companies such as Facebook and
Google have to comply with the requirements of the GDPR in
Europe, non-European citizens are not afforded the same level of
data protection.138
In the United States, data protection laws remain stagnant
because the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) is the main venue
for most privacy policy making.139 The United States does not have
a designated data protection agency similar to those created by the
GDPR, and the courts in the United States “mainly rule on the constitutionality of regulations, legislation, and government actions.”140
Despite playing an active role in data protection, the FTC’s authority
is limited to data breaches that fall within the scope of prohibiting
unfair or deceptive practices.141 Leticia Bode and Leta Jones note
that the FTC is “limited to enforcement of unfair or deceptive data
practices, generally tied to the terms of service drafted and published
by the data collectors and controllers and drafting policy recommendations and reports.”142 This in effect limits the authority of the FTC
to particular circumstances of data breaches that arise out of unfair
or deceptive practices.143
The U.S. Constitution enables the various States to develop and
implement privacy protection under their respective law.144 Each
State incorporates the protection of image rights either under statute

138

See Case C-507/17, Google Inc. v. Commission nationale de l’informatique et des
libertés (CNIL), 2019 E.C.R. 772 (Sept. 24, 2019) (limiting the right to be forgotten to only
EU countries).
139
See Leticia Bode & Meg Leta Jones, Ready to Forget: American Attitudes Toward the
Right to Be Forgotten, 33 INFO. SOC’Y 76, 77 (2017) (citing Daniel Solove & Woodrow
Harzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 600
(2014)).
140
Id.
141
See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006); see also Bode &
Jones, supra note 139.
142
See Bode & Jones, supra note 139, at 77.
143
In In re Snapchat, the FTC held that Snapchat’s claims that images would disappear
were false. Decision & Order, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C-4501 (Dec. 23,
2014); see also F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d. 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (hotel
chain failed to protect customers’ personal information stored on their information
systems).
144
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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or through common law.145 In their seminal work, Warren and
Brandeis argued for the protection of people’s privacy as photography and photographic equipment evolved.146 Concerned that the
development of photography intruded on people’s lives, Warren
and Brandeis attempted to protect image rights under the tort of
privacy.147 Building upon Warren and Brandeis’ tort of privacy,
William Prosser identified four torts for invasions of privacy.148
These torts are as follows:
(1) intrusion upon the plaintiff’s seclusion or
solitude or into his private affairs;
(2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts
about the plaintiff;
(3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light
in the public eye; and
(4) appropriation for the defendant’s advantage, of
the plaintiff’s name or likeness.149
At the state level, a person may draw upon either of the four torts
to protect specific invasions of privacy150 if the state has incorporated them in their common law. The most relevant of the four torts
which more closely relates to personal images is the appropriation
of a person’s likeness, also known as the right of publicity.151 For
example, Californian courts do protect personal images in the way
of personality rights; however, the protection is limited and balanced
with freedom of speech.152 The courts provide that “no cause of
action will lie for the ‘[p]ublication of matters in the public interest,
which rests on the right of the public to know and the freedom of the

145

See generally William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
147
Id. at 195–96 (citing Marion Manola v. Stevens & Myers, N.Y. Supreme Court, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 18, 21, 1890)).
148
See Prosser, supra note 145, at 389.
149
Id.; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 146, at 197.
150
Prosser, supra note 145, at 386–87.
151
Fraley v. Facebook Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 796–97 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
152
Id. at 805 (users were identified as “subjects of public interest among the same
audience”) (citing Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2001));
see also generally Grea, supra note 76.
146
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press to tell it. . . .’”153 While there is some protection of privacy in
relation to privacy of communications,154 more often it is balanced
against the public’s interest in knowing when the information relates
to matters of public concern.155 Further, the creation of an image
(personal or otherwise) is protected under copyright and thus more
readily protected under the First Amendment.156
This is not to suggest that the U.S. Constitution provides no
privacy protection. Rather, this protection is limited. For example,
there is protection for people’s privacy against intrusions by government.157 Even though the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide for a right to privacy for breaches of privacy between individuals,158 the FTC does offer some protection in certain circumstances
against breaches of personal information.159 However, in the context
of privacy protection for misuses of personal images, the protection
is limited to each individual state’s common law or statute. It can be
argued that whenever there are competing interests between privacy
and a creator’s freedom of expression, the courts traditionally favor

153

Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 34 Cal. App. 4th 790, 793 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995) (quoting Eastwood v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 409, 417 (Cal Ct. App.
1983)); see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 2012); Amy Morganstern, In the
Spotlight: Social Network Advertising and the Right of Publicity, 12 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULLETIN 181, 191 (2008); Koehler, supra note 76, at 984 (2013). Koehler further states
that “because California’s right of publicity statute prevents a commercial speaker from
inappropriately using an individual’s name or likeness and thus places a strain on what a
speaker can say, the right of publicity can conflict with the First Amendment’s free speech
and freedom of the press clauses.” Id. at 974–75.
154
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (broadcaster published a true
recording of a conversation albeit embarrassing); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469
(1975) (name of a rape victim was published); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967) (the
real names of juvenile offenders were published); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S.
46 (1988) (same); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (same).
155
See generally Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514.
156
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1884); see also
Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903).
157
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
158
See Siry, supra note 99.
159
See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also Bode & Jones,
supra note 139, at 77. See Decision & Order, In re Snapchat, Inc., F.T.C. Docket No. C4501 (Dec. 23, 2014); see also F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d
Cir. 2015).
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freedom of expression over privacy as it is a constitutional right
under the First Amendment.160
Freedom of the press is given precedence in instances when
there are competing interests between privacy and freedom of the
press to report news.161 There is a willingness to strike a more balanced approach between the right to privacy and the public’s right
to know, as highlighted in Virgil v. Time Inc,162 where Judge
Merrill stated:
Does the spirit of the Bill of Rights require that
individuals be free to pry into the unnewsworthy private affairs of their fellowmen? In our view it does
not. In our view, fairly defined areas of privacy must
have the protection of law if the quality of life is to
continue to be reasonably acceptable. The public’s
right to know is, then, subject to reasonable limitations so far as concerns the private facts of its individual members.163

160

See Siry, supra note 99.
See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (holding that the publication of a
rape victim’s name by a newspaper was lawfully obtained) (“We do not hold that truthful
publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of personal
privacy within which the State may protect the individual from intrusion by the press, or
even that a State may never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual offense.
We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when narrowly tailored to a
state interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is satisfactorily served by
imposing liability under § 794.03 to appellant under the facts of this case.”). However,
White, J., dissenting from the majority, stated:
Of course, the right to privacy is not absolute. Even the article widely
relied upon in cases vindicating privacy rights, Warren & Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890), recognized that this
right inevitably conflicts with the public’s right to know about matters
of general concern—and that sometimes, the latter must trump the
former. Id. at 214–15. Resolving this conflict is a difficult matter, and
I fault the Court not for attempting to strike an appropriate balance
between the two, but rather, fault it for according too little weight to
B. J. F.’s side of equation, and too much on the other.
Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
162
Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
163
Id. at 1128; see also Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 524.
161
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Despite having rich tort law to draw upon, when a plaintiff’s
privacy interests conflict with a defendant’s freedom of expression,
privacy protection is often weakened.164 As Judge Renwick
remarked in Foster v. Svenson, there are limitations to New York
State’s statutory privacy tort because the court is “constrained to
find that the invasion of privacy of one’s home that took place here
is not actionable as a statutory tort of invasion of privacy pursuant
to sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law.”165 New York State
Senator Kevin Thomas proposed a Bill known as the New York Privacy Act (“NYPA”) to strengthen privacy rights in New York.166
The NYPA attempts to rebalance the scales between protecting freedom of expression and privacy rights of users where their data have
been misused or used when the information is outdated or no longer
relevant.167 However, although the NYPA was introduced in May
2019,168 the bill did not receive a floor vote and has not progressed
beyond the committee stage.169
While there is some common ground between the basis for
privacy protection in both European and American courts, there are
signficant differences in the ways that privacy protection is
implemented in these jurisdictions. One such difference is that the
European perspective of developing data protection laws is
164

Bode & Jones, supra note 139, at 77.
Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 152 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
166
S.B. 5642, 242nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) (“An act to amend the general business
law, in relation to the management and oversight of personal data . . . . This act may be known
and cited as ‘New York Privacy Act.’”). Senator Kevin Thomas proposed the Bill; however, the
Bill did not successfully pass. See Kathryn Lundstrom, New York’s Privacy Bill Failed Last
Session, ADWEEK: DATA & PRIVACY (Feb. 21, 2020), https://www.adweek.com/digital/newyorks-privacy-bill-failed-last-session-but-it-gives-us-a-look-at-what-future-laws-might-looklike/ [https://perma.cc/WS6R-PJ5X ].
167
See Louis Nizer, The Right of Privacy: A Half Century’s Developments, 39 MICH. L. REV.
526, 540 (1941); see also Samantha Barbas, From Privacy to Publicity: The Tort of
Appropriation in the Age of Mass Consumption, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 1119, 1119 (2013); Grea,
supra note 76; Alison C. Storella, It’s Selfie-Evident: Spectrums of Alienability and
Copyrighted Content on Social Media, 94 B.U. L. REV 2045, 2069 (2014); W. Mack
Webner & Leigh Ann Lindquist, Transformation: The Bright Line Between Commercial
Publicity Rights and the First Amendment, 37 U. AKRON L. REV. 171, 188 (2004); W.A.C., The
Right of Privacy in News Photographs, 44 VA. L. REV. 1303, 1315 (1958).
168
See S.B. 5642.
169
See Sen. Kevin Thomas, Legislation, N.Y. ST. SENATE, https://www.nysenate.gov/
senators/kevin-thomas/legislation [https://perma.cc/FCL2-424G]; see also S.B. 5642.
165
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entrenched in various legislation. For example, the European
Charter of Human Rights provides that individuals have the right to
private life.170 The GDPR further strengthens this right by protecting
a person’s right to control their data.171 Whilst ensuring that privacy
rights need to be balanced with freedom of expression, the legislation incorporates freedom of expression as an exception as to
when privacy rights can be exercised.172 In fact, European courts
have considered the competing interests between one person’s privacy interests and another’s freedom of expression.173
On the contrary, there is no singular piece of legislation that
protects privacy in the United States. Rather, freedom of expression
is protected and valued above privacy interests as it is part of the
First Amendment of U.S. Constitution.174 Conseqently, in situations
where there are competing intests between a person’s privacy and
another person’s freedom of expression, American courts err in
favor of freedom of expression.175 Therefore, the protection of
freedom of expression and freedom of speech has eroded the privacy
interests that Warren and Brandeis recognized in tort law.176
The expanding mass media, and the widespread use of social
networks, have highlighted the imbalance between individual
privacy and freedom of expression in American law and American
life. Webb argues that “characterizing the emergence of a balancing
approach in the U.S constitutional law as erosion misses the

170

See EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 64.
See sources cited supra note 32.
172
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
173
For example, in Von Hannover v. Germany, Princess Caroline of Monaco campaigned
to prevent publications of photographs taken without her consent while going about her
everyday life: going shopping, going horse riding, eating, holidaying, tripping on the beach.
Von Hannover v. Germany (No.1), App No. 59320/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (June 24, 2004); see
also N. A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places, 65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 606, 607, 614 (2006).
174
See Richard J. Peltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L., 365, 384,
409–10 (2013); see also Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015);
Amy Gajda, Privacy, Press, and the Right to Be Forgotten in the United States, 93 WASH.
L. REV. 201, 238–43 (2018).
175
See Foster v. Svenson, 128 A.D.3d 150, 161 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015).
176
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 146, at 197 (tort of intrusion upon seclusion, tort
of public disclosure of private fact, false light and appropriation); see also Prosser, supra
note 145, at 389 (Prosser made the subdivision); Mantelero, supra note 4, at 229–35, 230.
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mark.”177 This is because “[s]hifts in U.S law are necessary to avoid
staleness and obsolescence in light of new technologies and
changing worldviews.”178 Where information centers on public
officials or public figures, an American court is very likely to favor
freedom of the press over personal privacy, especially if the
matters reported are highly newsworthy and likely to be in the
public’s interest.179
Although personal images may be protected under American tort
law to some extent, there are gaps in the existing law when a third
party captures a person’s image in a photograph. As the New York
Appellate Division noted in Foster v. Svenson:
[A]cknowledging that Civil Rights Law sections 50
and 51 reflect a careful balance of a person’s right to
privacy against the public’s right to a free flow of
ideas, plaintiffs argue that defendant’s work should
not be entitled to First Amendment protection
because of the manner or context in which it was
formed or made. In essence, plaintiffs seem to be
arguing that the manner in which the photographs
were obtained constitutes the extreme and outrageous conduct contemplated by the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress and serves to overcome the First Amendment protection contemplated
by Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51.180
In America, freedom of expression has become paramount to any
privacy right, especially when the photograph is artistic or newsworthy.181 This is particularly the case when people are captured in

177

Webb, supra note 134, at 1331.
Id. (“These shifts require the ebb and flow of certain rights and liberties to parallel
and reflect the values citizens place on those principles while the spirit of the U.S
Constitution remains fixed.”); see also Mantelero, supra note 4, at 238–43.
179
See Mantelero, supra note 4, at 229–35; see also Werner v. Times-Mirror Co., 193
Cal. App. 2d 111, 113 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (involving the invasion of privacy of a public
person).
180
Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 161 (emphasis added).
181
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 60–61 (1884); Bleistein
v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903); see also Storella, supra
note 167, at 2051–52; Gajda, supra note 174, at 238–43.
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photographs by third parties, as was the case in Foster v. Svenson.182
In that case, Svenson was a photographer who used a high-powered
lens to capture different photographs of his neighbours (the Fosters)
and their children playing, sleeping, and undressing in their home.183
The Fosters’ claims for invasion of privacy were unsuccesful
because the images were protected as artistic works.184
While it makes plaintiffs cringe to think their private lives and
images of their small children can find their way into the public forum of an art exhibition, there is no redress under the current laws
of the State of New York. “Simply, an individual’s right to privacy
under the New York Civil Rights Law sections 50 and 51 yield [sic]
to an artist’s protections under the First Amendment under the circumstances presented here.”185
However, the appellate court highlighted the gaps in the way that
tort law protected personal images in the United States:
New technologies can track thought, movement, and
intimacies, and expose them to the general public,
often in an instant. This public apprehension over
new technologies invading one’s privacy became a
reality for the plaintiffs and their neighbors when a
photographer, using a high powered camera lens
inside his own apartment, took photographs through
the window into the interior of apartments in a
neighboring building. The people who were being
photographed had no idea this was happening. This
case highlights the limitations of New York’s
statutory privacy tort as a means of redressing harm
that may be caused by this type of technological
home invasion and exposure of private life. We are
constrained to find that the invasion of privacy of
one’s home that took place here is not actionable as
a statutory tort of invasion of privacy pursuant to

182

See Foster v. Svenson, No. 651826/2013, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 5, 2013).
183
See id.; see also Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 152–53.
184
See Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 163.
185
Foster, 2013 WL 3989038, at *1.
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sections 50 and 51 of the Civil Rights Law, because
defendant’s use of the images in question constituted
art work and, thus is not deemed “use for advertising
or trade purposes,” within the meaning of the
statute.186
The court further acknowledged that U.S. law did not address situations where people are photographed in the privacy of their own
homes:
Undoubtedly, like plaintiffs, many people would be
rightfully offended by the intrusive manner in which
the photographs were taken in this case. However,
such complaints are best addressed to the Legislature—the body empowered to remedy such inequities. Needless to say, as illustrated by the troubling
facts here, in these times of heightened threats to privacy posed by new and ever more invasive technologies, we call upon the Legislature to revisit this important issue, as we are constrained to apply the law
as it exists.187
There are some similarities between Australian and American
privacy protection, which is due to a fragmented approach of
protecting privacy interests. As commonly known, there are inconsistencies of privacy protection among the various States in
America.188 These inconsistencies may be viewed as a double-edged
sword, where the inconsistency may serve as a vehicle for potential
state law reform, but people in other states are left without the same
rights. It is also uncertain whether other states would follow and
adopt into their state legislation another state’s law reform. A lack
of uniformity means that state laws vary and may not adequately
protect people’s privacy.
One difference between Australia and the United States is that
despite having a fragmented approach to the protection of personal
images, Australia has legislation at the federal level which, despite
186

Foster, 128 A.D.3d at 152 (emphasis added).
Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
188
See generally Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
203 (1954).
187
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having gaps, may make it easier to propose law reform to align with
the GDPR. Notably, since the emergence of the right to be forgotten,
the State of New York has introduced a bill for a Privacy Act,189
which could potentially align with Europe’s GDPR. The proposed
Privacy Act would empower New Yorkers to sue companies directly
over privacy violations.190
In particular, the proposed New York Privacy Act could pave
the way for privacy reform in other states. For example, there are
serious claims against Facebook for privacy breaches in other states
like Illinois.191 Following numerous data breaches, companies such
as Facebook have been fraught with privacy claims. Similar situations have occurred in European countries such as France, where
Facebook and Google have been fined by privacy regulatory bodies
because of their failure to protect their users’ privacy.192
CONCLUSION
The right to be forgotten has the potential to re-shift the power
imbalance that social networks hold over their users’ images by
enabling the users to regain some control. As Bernal argues, “That
kind of transfer of power, that kind of re-balancing, could have possibilities to redress the current imbalance over personal data—and
to help re-establish at least some control that people have lost and
feel that they have lost.”193 An alternative view is that the the right
to be forgotten does not in fact restrict freedom of speech, but that
[The] concept of the right to be forgotten is based on
the fundamental need of an individual to determine
the development of his life in an autonomous way,
without being perpetually or periodically stigmatized
as a consequence of a specific action performed in
189

See S.B. 5642, 242nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019).
See Karl Bode, New York State’s Privacy Law Would Be Among the Toughest in the
US, TECHDIRT (June 6, 2019), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190605/07035842338/
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See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1267 (9th Cir. 2019).
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See Alex Hern, Google Fined Record £44m by French Data Protection Watchdog,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/21/googlefined-record-44m-by-french-data-protection-watchdog [https://perma.cc/4Z3T-66HD].
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Bernal, supra note 4.
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the past, especially when these events occurred many
years ago and do not have any relationship with the
contemporary context.194
This is particularly the case where the right to be forgotten is
balanced against freedom of the press.195 As noted by the European
Court of Justice,
[The] balance may however depend, in specific
cases, on the nature of the information in question
and its sensitivity for the data subject’s private life
and on the interest of the public in having that
information, an interest which may vary, in
particular, according to the role played by the data
subject in public life.196
When people are photographed, their images are captured and
their ability to control the use of their image is restricted. This
restriction is particularly acute when the image is captured by a third
party. The difficulty that arises is that the creator of the image has
the right to control the use of the photograph. Consequently, the
person who is the subject of that image is unable to control how the
image and the information captured in the image are used. The lack
of user’s control over their image was also highlighted above in the
New York case Foster v. Svenson, where the Fosters were unable to
control the use of their images that had been captured by Svenson
because the image fell within an artistic work.197 When personal
images are uploaded on social networks such as Facebook, those
images are effectively controlled by the social network and may be
accessed or stored even if a user has withdrawn their consent.198 The
New York Privacy Act, if enacted, and successful, potentially provides privacy protection that is more robust as it would be in
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Mantelero, supra note 4, at 230.
See General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 80; see also Case C131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), 2014
E.C.R. 317, ¶ 20.
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Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos
(AEPD), 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 81.
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addition to the existing protection that is afforded under the current
legal framework.
The European right to be forgotten would provide people
in Australia or the United States with greater control over their
images if both countries adopted the right. However, to improve further, a number of changes should be considered in the European
model itself. The European law could be improved, for example, by
clarifying who has the responsibility to remove images, particularly
where there are multiple parties involved. It would also be helpful
to clarify the situations where an image may be required to be
removed or deleted.
Clarification is also needed about when consent may be withdrawn. To minimize the adverse effects of the exception it might
also be useful to consider limiting its use to reasonable withdrawal.199 Consideration should also be given to amending the
personal and household exemption,200 because if a personal and
199

See, e.g., General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 27, at art. 7; see also id. at
rec. 32:
Consent should be given by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely
given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data
subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him
or her, such as by a written statement, including by electronic means,
or an oral statement. This could include ticking a box when visiting an
internet website, choosing technical settings for information society
services or another statement or conduct which clearly indicates in this
context the data subject’s acceptance of the proposed processing of his
or her personal data. Silence, pre-ticked boxes or inactivity should not
therefore constitute consent. Consent should cover all processing
activities carried out for the same purpose or purposes. When the
processing has multiple purposes, consent should be given for all of
them. If the data subject’s consent is to be given following a request
by electronic means, the request must be clear, concise and not
unnecessarily disruptive to the use of the service for which it is
provided.
200
Oliver Butler, The Expanding Scope of the Data Protection Directive: The Exception
for a ‘Purely Personal or Household Activity,’ 3–4, 8 (Univ. of Cambridge Faculty of Law,
Working Paper No. 54, 2015), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660916 [https://perma.cc/DN9PG8GV] (referring to the problem of using spatial logic in the interpretation of the exception
of purely personal or household activity which applies to the Data Protection Directive
95/46/EC). In particular, the author refers to Ryneš v. Úrad pro ochranu osobních údaju,
C-212/13, ECR 0 (2014), where he quotes the Advocate General:
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house purpose was included in Australian law it would leave many
images unprotected and vulnerable to misuse. However, any such
modification of the European model in this respect would have to be
done in a manner that carefully balanced the right of individuals to
protect their personal images with the ability for individuals to
express themselves by uploading images (which was the motivation
behind the exception). This is not to suggest that the exception
should be abolished so much that it should be modified to take
account of the new realities of new technologies.201
Overall, it is clear that the EU GDPR provides better protection
for people whose images are shared and exchanged on social networks. This Article has argued that the EU’s right to be forgotten is
a useful mechanism that enables people to regain control over the
use of their images within a social network context. The European
right to be forgotten is intended to rebalance the scales between freedom of expression and privacy, especially when the information is
outdated or no longer relevant.202 This Article has shown that there
are exceptions as to the operation of the right to be forgotten which
could serve to limit the right, such as freedom of expression and the
press.
The Article has shown that while American courts have traditionally favored freedom of expression over privacy interests, there

In my view, “personal” activities under the second indent of Article
3(2) of Directive 95/46 are activities which are closely and objectively
linked to the private life of an individual and which do not significantly
impinge upon the personal sphere of others. These activities may,
however, take place outside the home. “Household” activities are
linked to family life and normally take place at a person’s home or in
other places shared with family members, such as second homes, hotel
rooms or private cars. All such activities have a link with the protection
of private life as provided for under Article 7 of the Charter.
Id. at 3–4.
201
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party “urge[d] the legislature to use the
process of introducing new data protection law as an opportunity to reduce as far as
possible the legal uncertainty that currently surrounds various aspects of individuals’
personal or household use of the internet.” Working Party, Annex 2, supra note 81, at 3.
202
See generally Nizer, supra note 167; see also Barbas, supra, note 167; Grea, supra
note 76; Storella, supra note 167; W.A.C., supra note 167; Webner & Lindquist, supra
note 167.
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is an increasing push to strengthen privacy protection. Despite not
having a unified single legislative instrument for the protection of
privacy, some states like New York have considered and proposed
privacy law reform by incorporating a right to be forgotten in their
statutory legislation. If passed, New York courts could serve as a
potential model for other states to follow suit. It is worth noting that
even if the United States incorporated a right to be forgotten, it may
not restrict freedom of expression as the American courts are likely
to rule in favor of First Amendment claims. Currently the law in
Australia values freedom of expression over privacy. While this may
have made sense in a pre-internet world, technological changes that
have radically changed the way that images are used and controlled
have challenged the now-outdated arrangements. The right to be forgotten would help to reset the scales between privacy and freedom
of expression. It is time that Australian law provided people with the
right to be forgotten as a way of preventing the misuse of their images. In so doing it would give them the right to control the use of
their personal images online.

